发布日期：2024-12-21 20:21 点击次数：63
一、经典文章porn hongkongdoll
1.经济学基本表面
亚当.斯密. (2009).国富论.上海三联书店.
卡尔.马克斯. (2009).老本论.上海三联书店.
Sen， Amartya (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.（中译本：《以解放看待发展》）
Acemoglu， D. and J. A. Robinson (2012). Why nations fail: the origins of power， prosperity， and poverty， SciELO Chile.（中译本：国度为什么会失败，湖南科技出书社，2017年）
戴维·兰德斯，国富国穷，新华出书社，2010
亨利.威廉.斯皮格尔(1999).经济想想的成长.北京:中国社会科学出书社.
布罗代尔，《十五至十八世纪的物资斯文、经济和老本主义》，商务印书馆，2017年
埃里克.弗鲁博顿、鲁谈夫.芮切特，《新轨制经济学》，姜建强、罗长久译，上海：上海东谈主民出书社，2006年.
汪丁丁、韦森和姚洋（2005）.《轨制经济学三东谈主谈》，北京：北京大学出书社
伊斯特利（2004），《在经济增长的迷雾中探索》，北京：中信出书社.
哈耶克，个东谈主主义与经济递次，邓正来译，北京：生计.念书.新知三联书店，2003年.
皮凯蒂(2014). 21世纪老本论.中信出书社.
2.财政税收基本表面
何廉，李锐(2011).财政学.商务印书馆.
罗森， H.S.，盖尔. (2015).财政学(第10版).北京：清华大学出书社.
阿特金森（Atkinson），斯蒂格里茨（Stiglitz）(1995).民众经济学.上海：三联书店.
平新乔. (1995).财政旨趣与比拟财政轨制.三联书店上海分店、上海东谈主民出书社.
奥斯特罗姆(2000).民众事物的贬责之谈：集体行径轨制的演进.陈旭东、余逊达译.上海：上海三联书店.
Buchanan， James M. and Richard A. Musgrave (1999). Public Finance and Public Choice: Two Contrasting Visions of the State. Cambridge: MIT Press.（中译本：《民众财政和民众罗致：两种截然对立的国度不雅》）
王传纶，高培勇. (1998).现代西方财政经济表面.商务印书馆.
鲍德威，沙安文. (2011).政府间财政调遣支付:表面与本质.中国财政经济出书社.
3.会通政府
Wilson， J. Q. (2008).官僚机构，孙艳译，北京：生计.念书.新知三联书店.
叶礼庭《火与烬》、梁启超《李鸿章传》、黄仁宇《从大历史角度读蒋介石日志》
刘瑜（2009）：《民主的细节》.上海：上海三联书店.
艾克曼， (2000).堕落与政府.北京，新华出书社.
Alexander Hamilton， James Madison and John Jay . The Federalist Papers.(中译本，尹宣译，《联邦论》)
维托・坦茨，坦茨，王宇. (2014).政府与市集:变革中的政府职能.商务印书馆.
4.中国经济与中国财政
瞿同祖（2003），《清代地点政府》，北京：法律出书社
吴想（2001），《潜章程》，昆明：云南东谈主民出书社.（亦可参考吴想，《血酬定律》），或者《粉饰的递次》。
曾小萍（2005），《州县官的银两: 18世纪中国的合理化财政纠正》，北京：中国东谈主民大学出书社.
郭建龙，《中央帝国的财政密码》，鹭江出书社，2017年
吴敬琏（2004），《现代中国经济纠正》，上海：上海远东出书社.
科斯、王宁（2012），《变革中国》，北京：中信出书社.
劳伦.勃兰特、托马斯.罗斯基(2009).《伟大的中国经济转型》.上海:上海东谈主民出书社.
周黎安（2008）.《转型中的地点政府：官员激发与贬责》.上海：上海东谈主民出书社.
Huang， Y. (2008). Capitalism with Chinese characteristics: Entrepreneurship and the state. New York， Cambridge University Press.（无中译本，可参考黄亚生《中国神态有多独到？》）
杨志勇、杨之刚（2008）.中国财政纠正三十年.上海：上海东谈主民出书社。
刘克崮、贾康(2008).中国财税纠正三十年:亲历与回来.北京：经济科学出书社.
马骏(2005).中国民众预算纠正:感性化与民主化.北京，中央编译出书社.
李萍(2010).财政体制简明图解.北京：中国财政经济出书社.
楼继伟(2013).中国政府间财政关连再想考.中国财政经济出书社.
5.其他
罗兰・斯特龙伯格(2005).西方现代想想史，刘北成、赵国新译，中央编译出书社。
约翰·麦克里兰（2003），西方政事想想史，彭淮栋译，海南出书社。
乔治·霍兰·萨拜因（1986），政事学说史，盛葵阳、崔妙因译，商务印书馆
比尔.布莱森(2005)，万物简史，致力于于出书社。
史景迁（2005），《追寻现代中国》，上海：上海远东出书社。
钱穆（2001），《中国历代政事得失》，北京：生计.念书.新知三联书店.
青木昌彦. (2001).比拟轨制分析.上海远东出书社.
二、论文
钱颖一（2002）.“会通现代经济学.”经济社会体制比拟（2）: 1-12.
田国强（2005）.“现代经济学基分内析框架与筹主见式.”经济筹办(2): 113-126.
林毅夫和胡书东（2001）.“中国经济学百年回来.”《经济学（季刊）》(1): 3-17.
洪永淼(2007). "计量经济学的地位、作用和局限."经济筹办(05): 139-153.
马珺(2012). "财政学:两大传统的分立与会通."经济表面与经济管制(10): 63-73.
欢然、刘明兴、汪晖(2015). "纠正系列."金融时报中语网.
*关于中国纠正各方面问题的全方向梳理。虽然篇幅较大，不错罗致性望望。
周其仁(2008). "邓小平作念对了什么?——在芝加哥大学“中国纠正30年照管会”上的发言."中国纠正论坛: 7-29.
王永钦， et al. (2007). "中国的大国发展谈路——论均权式纠正的得失."经济筹办(1): 4-16.
欢然，陆曦，苏福兵and汪晖(2009). "地区竞争神气演变下的中国转轨:财政激发和发展神态反想."经济筹办(7): 21-33.
徐现祥， et al. (2011). "中国区域发展的政事经济学."寰宇经济文汇(3): 26-58.
汪德华，怎样鼓励中国财税纠正？FT中语网，2013年11月07日，
Wong， C. C. P. and R. M. Bird (2009). “中国的财政体系：进行中的职责”.见勃兰特和罗斯基，《伟大的中国经济转型》.上海，格致出书社.
周雪光(2011). "巨擘体制与灵验贬责:现代中国国度贬责的轨制逻辑."洞开时期(10): 67-85.
杨其静、聂辉华(2008). "保护市集的联邦主义过火批判."经济筹办(3): 99-114.
范子英(2011). "中国财政调遣支付轨制：目标、成果及留传问题."南边经济(6): 67-80.
周飞舟(2012). "财政资金的专项化过火问题."社会(1): 1-37.
周黎安(2007). "中国父母官员的擢升锦标赛神态筹办."经济筹办(7): 36-50.
欢然， et al. (2010). "经济增长大略带来擢升吗.——对擢升锦标竞赛表面的逻辑挑战与省级实证重估."管制寰宇(12): 13-26.
杨其静、郑楠(2013). "地点携带擢升竞争是标尺赛、锦标赛也曾经验赛."寰宇经济(12): 130-156.
马骏、侯一麟(2004). "中国省级预算中的非矜重轨制:一个交游用度表面框架."经济筹办(10): 14-23.
杨良松、庞保庆（2014）.省长管钱？——论省级携带关于地点财政开销的影响，民众行政商量（4）：72-111.
Tax Incidence
Partial Equilibrium Incidence
A. Atkinson and J. Stiglitz.Lectures on Public Economics， New York: McGraw Hill， 1980. Chapter 6.
R. Chetty， A. Looney， and K. Kroft. “Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence.”American Economic Review99(4): 1145-1177， 2009. Section V.C.
L. Kotlikoff and L. Summers. “Tax Incidence，” in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， Volume 2， 1043-1092. Required reading: Sections 0， 1， 2， 3.1， and 4.4.
B. Salanie.The Economics of Taxation， Cambridge: MIT Press， 2003， Chapter 1.
E.G. Weyl and M. Fabinger， “Pass-Through as an Economic Tool，” Univ. of Chicago mimeo.， 2012
Empirical Applications
J. Adda and F. Cornaglia. “Taxes， Cigarette Consumption and Smoking Intensity，”American Economic Review，96(4): 1013—1028， 2006.
T. Besley and H. Rosen. “Sales Taxes and Prices: An Empirical Analysis”，National Tax Journal52， (1999).
J. Doyle and K. Samphantharak. “$2.00 Gas! Studying the Effects of a Gas Tax Moratorium.”Journal of Public Economics，April 2008.
W. Evans， J. Ringel， and D. Stech. “Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking，” inTax Policy and the Economy， vol. 13， ed. J. Poterba， MIT Press: Cambridge， 1999.
Goolsbee， Austan， Michael F. Lovenheim， and Joel Slemrod. 2010. "Playing with Fire: Cigarettes， Taxes， and Competition from the Internet."American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 2(1): 131–54
J. Gruber and B. Koszegi. “Tax Incidence when Individuals are Time-Inconsistent: The Case of Cigarette Excise Taxes，”Journal of Public Economics(2004)， 88(9-10)， 1959-1987.
S. F. Hamilton， "Excise Taxes with Multiproduct Transactions，"American Economic Review， vol. 99(1)， pages 458-71， March， 2009.
Hastings， Justine， and Ebonya Washington. 2010. "The First of the Month Effect: Consumer Behavior and Store Responses."American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 2(2): 142–62.
R. Kerschbamer and G. Kirchsteiger， 2000. “Theoretically robust but empirically invalid? An experimental investigation into tax equivalence，”Economic Theory， 16: 719-734.
J. Poterba. “Lifetime Incidence and the Distributional Burden of Excise Taxes，”American Economic Review79 (May 1989)， 325-330.
J. Rothstein. “Is the EITC as Good as an NIT? Conditional Cash Transfers and Tax Incidence，”American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 2(1)， February 2010， 177-208.
General Equilibrium Incidence
A. Auerbach， “Who Bears the Corporate Tax? A Review of What We Know” NBER Working Paper 11686， October 2005.
C. Davidson and L. Martin， “General Equilibrium Incidence Under Imperfect Competition: A Quantity-Setting Supergame Analysis”，Journal of Political Economy， 93(6)， December 1985， 1212-1223.
P. Diamond. “Tax Incidence in a Two-Good Model，”Journal of Public Economics， 9(3)， June 1978， 283-299.
A. Harberger. “The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax，”Journal of Political Economy， 1962， 215-240.
L. Kotlikoff and L. Summers. “Tax Incidence，” in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein，Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 2， Sections 2.2.1-2.2.3 and 2.3.
N. Stern. “The Effects of Taxation， Price Controls， and Government Intervention in Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition”，Journal of Public Economics， 32(2)， March 1987， 133-158.
Open Economy Applications
D. Bradford， “Factor Prices May Be Constant but Factor Returns are Not，”Economic Letters， volume 1， 1978， 199-203.
* M. Feldstein and C. Horioka， “Domestic Savings and International Capital Flows”，Economic Journal， 90(358)， June 1980， 314-329.
L. Kotlikoff and L. Summers， “Tax Incidence”， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， Volume 2， 1043-1092， Section 3.1.
Capitalization and the Asset Price Approach
D. Cutler， “Tax Reform and the Stock Market: An Asset Price Approach，”American Economic Review， 78(5)， December 1988， 1107-1117， esp. Sections I-III.
* J. Friedman，“The Incidence of the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit: Using Asset Prices to Assess Its Impact on Drug Makers，” Harvard Kennedy School Working Paper， 2009.
J. Gyourko and J. Tracy， “The Structure of Local Public Finance and the Quality of Life，”Journal of Political Economy， 99(4)， August 1991， 774-806.
* L. Linden and J. Rockoff “There Goes the Neighborhood? Estimates of the Impact of Crime Risk on Property Values from Megan's Laws，”American Economic Review98(3): 1103-1127， 2008.
D. Lyon， “The Effect of the Investment Tax Credit on the Value of the Firm，”Journal of Public Economics， 38(2)， March 1989， 227-247.
J. Poterba， “Tax Subsidies to Owner-Occupied Housing: An Asset Market Approach，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 99(4)， November 1984， 729-752.
J. Roback， “Wages， Rents， and the Quality of Life”，Journal of Political Economy， 1982， 1257-1276.
K. Rosen， “The Impact of Proposition 13 on House Prices in Northern California: A Test of the Interjurisdictional Capitalization Hypothesis”，Journal of Political Economy， 90(1)， February 1982， 191-200.
L. Summers， “The Asset Price Approach to the Analysis of Capital Income Taxation”，Proceedings of the National Tax Association， 1983， 112-120.
Mandated Benefits
D. Acemoglu and J. Angrist， “Consequences of Employment Protection? The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act，’’Journal of Political Economy109(5) 915-957，2001
D. Cutler， and B. Madrian， “Labor Market Implications of Rising Health Insurance Costs”，RAND Journal of Economics， Autumn 1998， 509-530.
J. Gruber， “The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits，”American Economic Review， 84(3)， June 1994， 622-641.
J. Gruber and A. Krueger “The Incidence of Mandated Workers Compensation”， in D. Bradford， ed.，Tax Policy and the Economy， Volume 5， 111-143， Cambridge， MA: MIT Press， 1991.
J. Gruber， “The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile.” Journal of Labor Economics 15， 1997， S73-S91.
J. Kolstad and A. Kowalski， “Mandate-Based Health Reform and the Labor Market: Evidence from the Massachusetts Reform” NBER Working Paper No. 17933， 2012
C. Ruhm， “The Economic Consequences Of Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons From Europe，”Quarterly Journal of Economics113(1): 285-317， 1998.
L. Summers， “Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits，”American Economic Review， 79(2)， May 1989， 177-183.Excess Burden
Theory
A. Auerbach， “The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation”， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein，Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 1， 61-127. Amsterdam: North Holland， 1985. Sections 1， 2， 3.1， and 4.
A. Auerbach， J. Hines ， “Taxation and Economic Efficiency”， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein，Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 3， Chapter 21，Amsterdam: North Holland， 2002.
C. Ballard， D. Fullerton， J. Shoven， and J. Whalley，A General Equilibrium Model for Tax Policy Evaluation， Chicago: University of Chicago Press， 1985， Chapters 2， 3.
* C. Ballard， J. Shoven， and J. Whalley.， “General Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxes in the United States”，American Economic Review， March 1985， 128-138.
E. Browning， “On the marginal welfare cost of taxation.”American Economic Review77: 11–23， 1987.
D. Bernheim and A. Rangel， 2009. “Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 124(1): pages 51-104.
Blomquist， Sören， Vidar Christiansen， and Luca Micheletto. 2010. "Public Provision of Private Goods and Nondistortionary Marginal Tax Rates."American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 2(2): 1–27.
R. Chetty， “Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods.”Annual Review of Economics1: 451-488， 2009.
R. Chetty， A. Looney， and K. Kroft. “Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence.”American Economic Review99(4): 1145-1177， 2009. Section V.C.
Chipman， John S. and James C. Moore. “Compensating Variation， Consumer's Surplus and Welfare.”American Economic Review， 70(5)， 1980， 933-49.
D. Corlett and E. Hauge， “Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation.”Review of Economic Studies21(1): 21-30， 1953
P. Diamond and D. McFadden， “Some Uses of the Expenditure Function in Public Finance，”Journal of Public Economics3 (1974)， 3-21.
D. Fullerton， “Reconciling Recent Estimates of the Marginal Welfare Cost of Taxation”，American Economic Review， 81(1)， March 1991， 302-308.
* A. Harberger， “The Measurement of Waste”，American Economic Review， 54(3)， 1964， 58-76.
J. Hausman， “Exact Consumers Surplus and Deadweight Loss”，American Economic Review， 71(4)， September 1981， 662-676.
J. Hausman and W. Newey， “Nonparametric Estimation of Exact Consumers Surplus and Deadweight Loss，”Econometrica63 (1995)， 1445-1476.
James J. Heckman， "Building Bridges between Structural and Program Evaluation Approaches to Evaluating Policy，"Journal of Economic Literature， vol. 48(2)， pages 356-98， June， 2010.
S. Mullainathan， W. Congdon， and J. Kling， "Behavioral Economics and Tax Policy"National Tax Journal， 62， 2009， 375-86.
Applications
D. Albouy， "The Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation，"Journal of Political Economy， vol. 117(4)， pages 635-667， 08， 2009.
A. M. Bento and Lawrence H. Goulder and Mark R. Jacobsen and Roger H. von Haefen， "Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Increased US Gasoline Taxes，"American Economic Review， vol. 99(3)， pages 667-99， June， 2009.
* R. Chetty. “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance.”American Economic Journal: Economic Policy: 1(2): 31–52， 2009.
M. Feldstein， “Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax，”Review of Economics and Statistics， 81(4)， November 1999， 674-680.
M. Feldstein， “The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act，”Journal of Political Economy103: 551-572， 1995.
K. Gallagher and E. Muehlegger， 2008. “Giving Green to Get Green: Incentives and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology，”Journal of Environmental Economics and Management， 61(1): 1-15， January 2011.
A. Goolsbee， “The Value of Broadband and the Deadweight Loss of Taxing New Technologies，”Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy (B.E. Press Journals)，5(1)， 2006.
Yuriy Gorodnichenko and Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Klara Sabirianova Peter， "Myth and Reality of Flat Tax Reform: Micro Estimates of Tax Evasion Response and Welfare Effects in Russia，"Journal of Political Economy， vol. 117(3)， pages 504-554， 06， 2009
* L. Goulder and R. Williams. "The Substantial Bias from Ignoring General Equilibrium Effects in Estimating Excess Burden， and a Practical Solution，"Journal of Political Economy， 2003， 111:898-927.
* J. Marion and E. Muehlegger. “Measuring Illegal Activity and the Effects of Regulatory Innovation: Tax Evasion and the Dyeing of Untaxed Diesel，”Journal of Political Economy116:4， p.633-666， August 2008.
* J. Poterba， “Taxation and Housing: Old Questions， New Answers，”American Economic Review82(2): 237-242， May 1992.
Optimal Taxation
Commodity Taxation
E. Ahmad and N. Stern， “The Theory of Reform and Indian Indirect Taxes”，Journal of Public Economics， 25(3)， December 1984， 259-298.
A. Atkinson and J. Stiglitz，Lectures on Public Economics， New York: McGraw Hill， 1980. Chapter 12-1，12-2， and 12-5.
A. Auerbach， “The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation”， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， Handbook of Public Economics， 1985， Volume 1， 61-127， Section 5.
A. Auerbach and J. Hines， “Taxation and Economic Efficiency，” in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， 2002， Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 3， 61-125.
T. Besley and I. Jewitt， “Uniform Taxation and Consumer Preferences”，Journal of Public Economics， September 1995， 58， 73-84.
Boadway， Robin， and Motohiro Sato. "Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with an Informal Sector."American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 1(1): 1–27， 2009.
R. Burgess and N. Stern， “Taxation and Development”，Journal of Economic Literature， 31(2)， 1993， 762-830.
P. Diamond， “A Many-Person Ramsey Tax Rule，”Journal of Public Economics， 4， 1975， 335-342.
P. Diamond and J. Mirrlees， “Optimal Taxation and Public Production，”American Economic Review， 61， 1971， 8-27 and 261-278.
* T. O’Donoghue， and M. Rabin， 2006. “Optimal Sin Taxes.”Journal of Public Economics90: 1825-1849..
F. Ramsey， “A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation”，Economic Journal，37， 1927， 47-61.
A. Sandmo， “Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature”，Journal of Public Economics， 6(1-2)， July-Aug 1976， 37-54.
Taxation of Savings
D. Bernheim， "Taxation and Saving"， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 3， Chapter 18， Amsterdam: North Holland， 2002， Section 4.
D. Bernheim， A. Frandkin， and I. Popov， “The Welfare Economics of Default Options: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of 401(k) Plans” NBER Working Paper 17587， November 2011.
D. Bernheim and D. Garrett. "The Effects Of Financial Education In The Workplace: Evidence From A Survey Of Households，"Journal of Public Economics， 87(7-8)， August 2003， 1487-1519.
E. Bronchetti， T. Dee， D. Huffman， and E. Magenheim， "When a Nudge Isn't Enough: Defaults and Saving Among Low-Income Tax Filers" NBER Working Paper 16887， March 2011.
D. Card and M. Ransom， "Pension Plan Characteristics and Framing Effects in Employee Savings Behavior，" Review of Economics and Statistics， 93(1)， February 2011， 228-243.
* G. Carroll， J. Choi， D. Laibson， B. Madrian and A. Metrick， "Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions，" Quarterly Journal of Economics， 124(4)， November 2009， 1639-1674.
R. Chetty， J. Friedman， S. Leth-Petersen， and T. Nielsen， "Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-out in Retirement Savings: Evidence from Denmark，" Harvard Univ. Working Paper， 2012.
J. Choi， D. Laibson and B. Madrian “Reducing the Complexity Costs of 401(k) Participation Through Quick Enrollment"， in D.A. Wise，Developments in the Economics of Aging， Chicago: University of Chicago Press， March 2009. Also available as NBER Working Paper 11979.
J. Choi， D. Laibson， B. Madrian， and A. Metrick， "Optimal Defaults"，American Economic Review， 93， 2003， 180-185.
E. Duflo， W. Gale， J. Liebman and P. Orszag， E. Saez， "Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block，" Quarterly Journal of Economics， 121(4)， 2006， 1311-1346.
E. Duflo and E.Saez， "The Role of Information and Social Interactions in Retirement Plan Decisions: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment"，Quarterly Journal of Economics， 118， 2003， 815-842.
G. Engelhardt and A. Kumar， "Employer Matching and 401(k) Saving: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Study"，Journal of Public Economics，91(10): 1920-1943， 2007.
* E. Engen， W. Gale and J. Scholz， "The Illusory Effects of Saving Incentives on Saving，"Journal of Economic Perspectives， 10(4)， 1996， 113-38.
W. Gale and J. Scholz， "IRAs and Household Saving"，American Economic Review， 84， 1994， 1233-1260.
A. Gelber， "How do 401(k)s Affect Saving? Evidence from Changes in 401(k) Eligibility，"American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 3:4， 2011， 103-122.
B. Madrian and D. Shea， "The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior"，Quarterly Journal of Economics， 116(4)， November 2001， 1149-1187.
* J. Poterba， S. Venti， and D. Wise， "How Retirement Saving Programs Increase Saving"Journal of Economic Perspectives，10， Fall 1996， 91-112.
R. Thaler and S. Benartzi， "Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee Saving"，Journal of Political Economy，112(S1)， February 2004， 164-187.
S. Venti and D. Wise， "Have IRAs Increased U.S. Saving? Evidence from Consumer Expenditure Surveys"，Quarterly Journal of Economics， 105， 1990， 661-698.
Income Taxation
Atkinson， A.B.，欧美性爱综合姐姐 Stiglitz， J.E.， “The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation.”Journal of Public Economics6， 1976， 55-75.
* M. Brewer， E. Saez， and A. Shephard “Means Testing and Tax Rates on Earnings”， IFS Working Paper，The Mirrlees Review: Reforming the Tax System for the 21st Century， Oxford University Press， 2009.
* P. Diamond， “Optimal Income Taxation: An Example with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates”，American Economic Review， 88， March 1998， 83-95.
P. Diamond and E. Saez， “The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations，”Journal of Economic Perspectives，25(4): 165-190， 2011.
M. Golosov， A. Tsyvinski， and I. Werning "New Dynamic Public Finance: a User's Guide" NBER Macro Annual 2006.
G. Laroque， 2005 “Indirect taxation is superfluous under separability and taste homogeneity: A simple proof”，Economic Letters， 87， 141-144.
N. G. Mankiw and M. Weinzierl. "The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution."American Economic Journal: Economic Policy2， no. 1 (2010): 155-176.
N.G. Mankiw， M. Weinzierl， and D. Yagan， 2009."Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice，" Journal of Economic Perspectives， vol. 23(4)， pages 147-74， Fall.
J. Mirrlees， “An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation”，Review of Economic Studies， 38， 1971， 175-208.
T. Piketty， "Implementation of First-Best Allocations via Generalized Tax Schedules，"Journal of Economic Theory， vol. 61(1)， October 1993， 23-41.
T. Piketty and E. Saez， “Income Inequality in the United States， 1913-1998”，Quarterly Journal of Economics， 116， 2003， 1-39.
T. Piketty， E. Saez， and S. Stantcheva， "Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities" NBER Working Paper 17616， November 2011.
E. Sadka， “On Income Distribution， Incentives Effects and Optimal Income Taxation”，Review of
Economic Studies， 43(2)， 1976， 261-268.
E. Saez， “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates”，Review of Economics Studies， 68， 2001， 205-229， Sections 1-3 and 5.
B. Salanie，The Economics of Taxation， Cambridge: MIT Press， 2011.
J. Slemrod， “Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems”，Journal of Economic Perspectives， 4(1)， Winter 1990， 157-178.
J. Stiglitz， “Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics”， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， Volume 2， 991-1041.
Transfer Programs
G. Akerlof， “The Economics of Tagging as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax”，American Economic Review， 68(1)， March 1978， 8-19.
A.B. Atkinson， “Income Maintenance and Social Insurance，” in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， eds.，Handbook of Public Economics Volume 2(Amsterdam: North Holland， 1987)， 779-908.
T. Besley and S. Coate， “Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income”，American Economic Review， 81(4)， September 1991， 979-984.
* T. Besley and S. Coate， “Workfare versus Welfare: Incentives Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs”，American Economic Review， 82(1)， March 1992， 249-261.
S. Coate， “Altruism， the Samaritan’s Dilemma， and Government Transfer Policy”，American Economic Review， 85(1)，March 1995， 46-57.
S. Coate， S. Johnson， and R. Zeckhauser， “Pecuniary Redistribution through In-Kind Programs”，Journal of Public Economics， 55(1)， September 1994， 19-40.
D. Lee and E. Saez “Optimal Minimum Wage in Competitive Labor Markets，” NBER Working Paper No. 14320， September 2008.
A. Nichols and R. Zeckhauser， “Targeting Transfers Through Restrictions on Recipients”，American Economic Review， 72(2)， May 1982， 372-377.
E. Saez， “Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses”，Quarterly Journal of Economics117 (2002)， 1039-1073.
B. Salanie，The Economics of Taxation， Cambridge: MIT Press， 2003， Chapter 8.
H. Varian， “Redistributive Taxation as Social Insurance，”Journal of Public Economics， 14 (1980)， 49-68.
R. Zeckhauser “Optimal Mechanisms for Income Transfer”American Economic Review， 61(3)， June 1971.
Income Taxation and Labor Supply
Estimating Labor Supply Elasticities
J. Altonji and C. Paxson. 1992. "Labor Supply， Hours Constraints， and Job Mobility."Journal of Human Resources27(2):256-278.
* O. Ashenfelter， "Determining Participation in Income-Tested Social Programs"Journal of the American Statistical Association， 78(383)， September 1983， 517-525.
O. Ashenfelter and M. Plant. (1990) "Non-Parametric Estimates of the Labor Supply Effects of Negative Income Tax Programs，"Journal of Labor Economics，8.1 (January)， S396-S415.
C. de Bartolome， 1995. “Which Tax Rate Do People Use: Average or Marginal?”Journal of Public Economics， 56: 79-96.
C.V. Brown， 1968. “Misconceptions About Income Tax and Incentives，”Scottish Journal of Political Economy， February: 1-12.
*F.D. Blau and L.M. Kahn "Changes in the Labor Supply Behavior of Married Women: 1980-2000"，Journal of Labor Economics， 2007 25:3， 393-438.
S. Blomquist， “Restrictions in Labor Supply Estimation: Is the MaCurdy Critique Correct?”Economics Letters47 (1995)， 229-235.
R. Blundell， A. Duncan and C. Meghir， “Estimating Labor Supply Responses Using Tax
Reforms，”Econometrica66 (July 1998)， 827-862.
* R. Blundell and T. Macurdy. (1999) “ Labor supply: a review of alternative approaches，” in theHandbook of Labor Economics， Volume 3A， O. Ashenfelter and D. Card， eds.
D. Card， "Intertemporal Labor Supply: An Assessment，" in C. Sims， ed.， Advances in Econometrics Sixth World Congress， Volume 2， Cambridge University Press， 1994. Also available as NBER Working Paper No. 3609.
N. Eissa “Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 as a Natural Experiment” NBER Working Paper 5023， 1995.
E. Fujii and C. Hawley， 1988. “On the Accuracy of Tax Perceptions，”Review of Economics and Statistics， 344-347.
* L. Friedberg (2000) “The Labor Supply Effects of the Social Security Earnings Test.”Review of Economics and Statistics82(1)， 48-63.
S. Haider and D. Loughran， “The Effect of the Social Security Earnings Test on Male Labor Supply: New Evidence from Survey and Administrative Data”， Journal of Human Resources，43(1)， 2008， 57-87.
J. Hausman "Taxes and Labor Supply"， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， eds，Handbook ofPublic Finance， Vol I， North Holland 1985， sections 1-3.
J. Heckman “What Has Been Learned About Labor Supply in the Past Twenty Years?”American Economic Review， Vol. 83， No. 2， Papers and Proceedings (May， 1993)， 116-121.
* T. Lemieux， B. Fortin， and P. Fréchette (1994)， "The Effect of Taxes on Labor Supply in the Underground Economy，"American Economic Review， 84， 231-254.
J. Liebman and R. Zeckhauser， 2004. “Schmeduling，” Harvard KSG Working Paper.
T. MaCurdy， H. Paarsch， and D. Green， "Assessing Empirical Approaches for Analyzing
Taxes and Labor Supply，"Journal of Human Resources， Summer 1990.
T.MaCurdy， (1981)， "An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life Cycle Setting，"Journal of Political Economy， 89(6)， 1059-1089
C. Meghir and David Phillips， “Labour supply and taxes”， inDimensions of Tax Design: the Mirrlees Review， Oxford University Press， 2010.
J. Pencavel. (1986) "Labor Supply of Men: A Survey，"Handbook of Labor Economics， vol. 1，
chapter 1.
Taxable Income Elasticities
G. Auten and R. Carroll， “The Effect of Income Taxes on Household Behavior，” Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (November 1999)， 681-93.
G. Break， “Income Taxes and Incentives to Work: An Empirical Study”，American Economic Review， 47(5)， September 1957， 529-549.
M. Feldstein， “The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act”，Journal of Political Economy， 103(3)， June 1995， 551-572.
M. Feldstein， “Tax Avoidance And The Deadweight Loss Of The Income Tax”Review of Economics and Statistics， November 1999， pp. 674-680.
A. Goolsbee， “What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from Executive Compensation，”Journal of Political Economy， 2001.
* J. Gruber and E. Saez， “"The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and Implications"Journal of Public Economics， 84， 2002， 1-32
* G. Imbens， D. Rubin， and B. Sacerdote， “Estimating the Effect of Unearned Income on Labor Earnings， Savings， and Consumption: Evidence from a Survey of Lottery"American Economic Review， 2001 (pp. 778-794)
H. Kleven， C. Landais， E. Saez “Taxation and International Mobility of Superstars: Evidence from the European Football Market”，American Economic Review， forthcoming.
H. Kleven， C. Landais， E. Saez， and E. Schultz， "Taxation and International Migration of Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigner Tax Scheme in Denmark" UC-Berkeley Working Paper， November 2012.
W. Kopczuk. “Tax bases， tax rates， and the elasticity of reported income，”Journal of Public Economics89(11-12)， pages 2093-2119， 2005.
J. Liebman and E. Saez， “Earnings Responses to Increases in Payroll Taxes，” UC-Berkeley， mimeo， 2006.
R. Moffitt and M. Wilhelm， “Taxation and the Labor Supply Decisions of the Affluent”， NBER Working Paper No. 6621， June 1998.
Saez， Emmanuel. 2010. "Do Taxpayers Bunch at Kink Points?" American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 2(3): 180–212.
E. Saez and M. Veall， “The Evolution of High Incomes in North-America: Lessons from the Canadian Evidence，”American Economic Review， 95(3): 831-849， 2005.
* E. Saez， “Reported Incomes and Marginal Tax Rates， 1960-2000: Evidence and Policy Implications”， in J. Poterba， ed.，Tax Policy and the Economy， Volume 18， Cambridge: MIT Press， 2004.
E. Saez， J. Slemrod， and S. Giertz (2009) “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review”，Journal of Economic Literature50(1): 3-50， March.
J. Slemrod， “Income Creation or Income Shifting? Behavioral Responses to the Tax Reform Act of 1986”，American Economic Review， 85(2)， May 1995， 175-180.
三上悠亚 肛交J. Slemrod， ed.Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic Consequences of Taxing the Rich， Harvard University Press， 2000.
J. Slemrod and S. Yitzhaki， “Tax Avoidance， Evasion， and Administration”， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein，Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 3， Chapter 22， Amsterdam: North Holland， 2002.
Welfare Programs and the Earned Income Tax Credit
M. Bitler， J. Gelbach， and H. Hoynes， “What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Impacts of Welfare Reform Programs，”American Economic Review， 96(4): 988-1012， September 2006.
* D. Card and D. Hyslop. “Estimating the Effects of a Time-Limited Earnings Subsidy for Welfare Leavers.”Econometrica， 73(6): 1723-1770， November 2005.
* R. Chetty and E. Saez， “Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an Experiment with EITC Claimants，”American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， forthcoming.
R. Chetty， J. Friedman， and E. Saez， “Using Differences in Knowledge Across Neighborhoods Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings” NBER Working Paper 18232， July 2012.
G. Dahl， K. Løken， and M. Mogstad "Peer Effects in Program Participation" NBER Working Paper 1898， June 2012.
N. Eissa and H. Hoynes， “Taxes and the Labor Market Participation of Married Couples: The Earned Income Tax Credit，”Journal of Public Economics， 88(9-10)， 1931-1958 (2004).
N. Eissa and J. Liebman， “Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit”，Quarterly Journal of Economics111 (1996)， 605-637
J. Grogger “The Effects of Time Limits， the EITC， and Other Policy Changes on Welfare Use， Work， and Income Among Female-Headed Families”， Review of Economic and Statistics， 2004 forthcoming.
J. Grogger and C. Michalopoulos， “Welfare Dynamics under Time Limits，”Journal of
Political Economy， vol. 111(3)， pages 530-554， June， 2003.
D. Jones， “Inertia and Overwithholding: Explaining the Prevalence of Income Tax Refunds”American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 4(1)， February 2012， 158–85.
L. Katz， J. Kling and J. Liebman “Moving to Opportunity in Boston: Early Results of a Randomized Mobility Experiment”，Quarterly Journal of Economics116 (May 2001)， 607-54.
B. Meyer and D. Rosenbaum， “Welfare， the Earned Income Tax Credit， and the Labor Supply of Single Mothers”，Quarterly Journal of Economics116(3): 1063-1114， 2001.
B. Meyer and J. Sullivan “Changes in the Consumption， Income， and Well-Being of Single Mother Headed Families，” American Economic Review 98(5): 2221-41， 2008.
C. Michalopoulos， P. Robins and D. Card， “When financial work incentives pay for themselves: evidence from a randomized social experiment for welfare recipients，” Journal of Public Economics， Volume 89， Issue 1， January 2005， Pages 5-29.
R. Moffitt， “Welfare Programs and Labor Supply”， in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein，Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 4， Chapter 34， Amsterdam: North Holland， 2003 or NBER Working Paper 9168 September 2002.
J. Rothstein. 2010. "Is the EITC as Good as an NIT? Conditional Cash Transfers and Tax Incidence."American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 2(1): 177–208.
tructural Elasticities and Macroeconomic Evidence
A. Alesina， E. Glaeser， and B. Sacerdote， “Work and Leisure in the U.S. and Europe: Why So Different?，” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2005， D. Acemoglu and K. Rogoff， eds.， 1-64.
S. Basu and M. Kimball， “Long Run Labor Supply and the Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution for Consumption，” University of Michigan mimeo 2002
* R. Chetty， “A New Method of Estimating Risk Aversion，”American Economic Review96(5): 1821-1834， December 2006.
R. Chetty， “Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Frictions: A Reconciliation of Micro and Macro Labor Supply Elasticities，”Econometrica， 80(3): 969-1018， 2012.
* R. Chetty， J. Friedman， T. Olsen， and L. Pistaferri. “Adjustment Costs， Firm Responses， and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 126(2)， 2011， 749-804.
* S. Davis and M. Henrekson， 2005. “Tax Effects on Work Activity， Industry Mix and Shadow Economy Size: Evidence from Rich-Country Comparisons，” InLabour Supply and Incentives to Work in Europe， eds. R. Gomez Salvador， A. Lamo， B. Petrongolo， M. Ward， and E. Wasmer， Edward Elgar Press.
M. Keane and R. Rogerson， "Micro and Macro Elasticities: A Reassessment of Conventional Wisdom"Journal of Economic Literature，50(2)， June 2012， 464-76
R. King， C. Plosser， and S. Rebelo， “Production， growth and business cycles : I. The basic neoclassical model， ”Journal of Monetary Economics21(2-3): 195-232， 1988.
L. Ohanian， A. Raffo， and R. Rogerson， “Long-Term Changes in Labor Supply and Taxes: Evidence from OECD Countries， 1956-2004，”Journal of Monetary Economics， 2008.
E. McGrattan & R. Rogerson， 1998. "Changes in hours worked since 1950，" Quarterly Review， Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis， pages 2-19.
E. Prescott， “Why Do Americans Work So Much More Than Europeans?”Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review， Vol. 28， No. 1， July 2004， pp. 2–13. (NBER WP 10316)
R. Rogerson “Taxation and Market Work: Is Scandinavia an Outlier?” Economic Theory 32 (2007)， 59-85.
Social Insurance
Market Failures and Motivations for Government Intervention
R. Chetty and A. Finkelstein， “Social Insurance: Connecting Theory to Data，” forthcoming，Handbook of Public Economics， volume 5， 2013.
R. Chetty and E. Saez. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance."American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 2(2): 85–114， 2010.
D. Cutler and S. Reber. “Paying For Health Insurance: The Trade-Off Between Competition And Adverse Selection，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 113(2)， May 1998， 433-466.
* L. Einav， A. Finkelstein， and M. Cullen， “Estimating Welfare in Insurance Markets Using Variation in Prices，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 125(3)， August 2010， 877-921.
L. Einav and A. Finkelstein， "Selection in Insurance Markets: Theory and Empirics in Pictures"Journal of Economic Perspectives，25(1)， 2011， 115-138.
L. Einav， A. Finkelstein， P. Shrimpf， “Optimal Mandates and the Welfare Cost of Asymmetric Information: Evidence From the U.K. Annuity Market，”Econometrica， 78(3)， May 2010， 1031-1092.
* A. Finkelstein and J. Poterba， “Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market，”Journal of Political Economy， 112， February 2004， 183-208.
N. Hendren， “Private Information and Insurance Rejections” Harvard University mimeo， 2012
N. Kiefer， “Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions，”Journal of Economic Literature26 (1988)， 646-79.
* A. Krueger and B. Meyer， “Labor Supply Effects of Social Insurance，” NBER Working Paper No. 9014， 2002.
* M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz， “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information”，Quarterly Journal of Economics， 90(4): 629-650， 1976.
Rothschild， Casey G.， "Adverse selection in annuity markets: Evidence from the British Life Annuity Act of 1808，"Journal of Public Economics， vol. 93(5-6)， pages 776-784， June， 2009.
J. Spinnewijn， “Heterogeneity， Demand for Insurance and Adverse Selection，” London School of Economics Working Paper， 2012.
Unemployment Insurance
Theory
D. Acemoglu and R. Shimer， “Efficient Unemployment Insurance，”Journal of Political Economy， 107(5)， October 1999， 893-928.
A. Atkeson and R. Lucas， “Efficiency and Equality in a Simple Model of Efficient Unemployment Insurance，”Journal of Economic Theory66 (1995)， 64-68.
A. Atkinson and J. Micklewright， “Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review，”Journal of Economic Literature29 (December 1991)， 1679-1727
M. Baily， “Some Aspects of Optimal Unemployment Insurance，”Journal of Public Economics10 (1978)， 379-402.
R. Chetty， “A General Formula for the Optimal Level of Social Insurance，”Journal of Public Economics90， 2006， 1879-1901.
R. Chetty， “Moral Hazard vs. Liquidity and Optimal Unemployment Insurance，”Journal of Political Economy116(2)， 2008， 173-234.
* R. Chetty and A. Szeidl， “Consumption Commitments and Risk Preferences”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 122(2)， 2007， 831-877.
R. Chetty and A. Looney， “Consumption Smoothing and the Welfare Consequences of Social Insurance in Developing Economies”Journal of Public Economics90: 2351–2356， 2006
W. Chiu and E. Karni， “Endogenous Adverse Selection and Unemployment Insurance，”Journal of Political Economy106 (1998)， 806-827.
M. Feldstein， “Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment，”Journal of Political Economy84 (October 1976)， 937-958.
M. Feldstein and D. Altman， “Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts，”Tax Policy and the Economyvol 21: 35-64， 2007.
* S. Shavell and L. Weiss， “The Optimal Payment of Unemployment Insurance Benefits over Time，”Journal of Political Economy87 (1979)， 1347-1362.
R. Shimer and I. Werning， “Reservation Wages and Unemployment Insurance，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 122(3)， 2007， 1145--1185.
R. Shimer and I. Werning， “Liquidity and Insurance for the Unemployed，”American Economic Review， 98(5)， December 2008， 1922-42.
J. Spinnewijn. “Unemployed but Optimistic: Optimal Insurance Design with Biased Beliefs，” London School of Economics Working Paper
C. Landais， “Assessing the Welfare Effects of Unemployment Benefits Using the Regression Kink Design，” London School of Economics Working Paper
* C. Landais， P. Michaillat， and E. Saez， “Optimal Unemployment Insurance over the Business Cycle，” NBER Working Paper 16526， 2012.
Empirics
Worker Behavior
* P. Anderson and B. Meyer， “Unemployment Insurance Takeup Rates and the After-Tax Value of Benefits，”Quarterly Journal of Economics112 (August， 1997) 913-938
O. Ashenfelter， D. Ashmore， and O. Deschenes， “Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States，”Journal of Econometrics， 125(1-2): 53-75， 2005.
* D. Black， J. Smith， M. Berger， and B. Noel “Is the Threat of Reemployment Services More Effective than the Services Themselves? Evidence from UI System Using Random Assignment，”American Economic ReviewSeptember 2003 93(4) 1313-27.
R. Blank and D. Card， “Recent Trends in Insured and Uninsured Unemployment: Is There an Explanation?，”Quarterly Journal of Economics106 (November 1991)， 1157-1190.
D. Blau and P. Robins， “Job Search Outcomes for the Employed and Unemployed，”Journal of Political Economy， 98 (1990)， 637-655.
M. Browning and T. Crossley， “Unemployment Insurance Levels and Consumption Changes，”Journal of Public Economics， 80(1)， 1-23， 2001
D. Card， R. Chetty， and A. Weber， “Cash-on-Hand and Competing Models of Intertemporal Behavior: New Evidence from the Labor Market，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 122(4)， 2007， 1511-1560.
* D. Card， R. Chetty， and A. Weber， “The Spike at Benefit Exhaustion: Leaving the Unemployment System or Finding a Job?，”American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings， 2007.
R. Chetty and A. Looney， “Income Risk and the Benefits of Social Insurance: Evidence from Indonesia and the United States，” in T. Ito and A. Rose， eds.Fiscal Policy andManagement: NBER East Asia Seminar on Economics 16. Also available as NBER Working Paper 11708.
J. B. Cullen and J. Gruber， “Spousal Labor Supply as Insurance: Does Unemployment Insurance Crowd Out the Added Worker Effect?”Journal of Labor Economics， 18(3): 546-572， July 2000.
R. Ehrenberg and R. Oaxaca， “Unemployment Insurance， Duration of Unemployment， and Subsequent Wage Gain，”American Economic Review66 (December 1976)， 754-766.
E. Engen and J. Gruber， “Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving，”Journal of Monetary Economics， 47(3): 545-579， June 2001.
M. Feldstein and J. Poterba， “Unemployment Insurance and Reservation Wages，”Journal of Public Economics23 (1984)， 141‑167.
J. Gruber， “The Consumption Smoothing Benefits of Unemployment Insurance，”American Economic Review87 (March 1997)， 192-205.
L. Katz and B. Meyer， “The Impact of the Potential Duration of Unemployment Benefits on the Duration of Unemployment，”Journal of Public Economics41 (February 1990)， 45-72.
Krueger， Alan B. and Mueller， Andreas， "Job Search and Unemployment Insurance: New Evidence from Time Use Data，"Journal of Public Economics， …， 2010
R. Lalive， J. Van Ours， J. Zweimuller， “How Changes in Financial Incentives Affect the Duration of Unemployment.”Review of Economic Studies73 (4)， 1009–1038
B. Meyer， “Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells，”Econometrica58 (July 1990)， 757-782.
B. Meyer， “Lessons from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Experiments，”Journal of Economic Literature33 (March 1995)， 91-131.
G. Solon， “Work Incentive Effects of Taxing Unemployment Benefits，”Econometrica， Vol. 53， No. 2. March 1985， pp. 295-306.
S. Woodbury and R. Spiegelman， “Bonuses to Workers and Employers to Reduce Unemployment: Randomized Trials in Illinois，”American Economic Review77 (1987)， 513-530.
J. Schmieder， T. von Wachter and S. Bender， “The Effects of Extended Unemployment Insurance Over the Business Cycle: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Estimates Over 20 Years，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 127(2)， 2012， 701-752.
* D. Sullivan and T. von Wachter， “Job Displacement and Mortality: An Analysis Using Administrative Data”，Quarterly Journal of Economics， 124(3)， August 2009， 1265-1306.
T. von Wachter， J. Song， J.， and J. Manchester， “Long-Term Earnings Losses due to Mass-Layoffs During the 1982 Recession: An Analysis Using Longitudinal Administrative Data from 1974 to 2004” Working Paper， Columbia University， 2009.
Firm Behavior
P. Anderson and B. Meyer， “The Unemployment Insurance Payroll Tax and Interindustry and Interfirm Subsidies，” in J. Poterba， ed.，Tax Policy and the Economy7 (1993)， 111-144.
O. Blanchard and J. Wolfers， “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence，”Economic Journal， March 2000
D. Card and P. Levine， “Unemployment Insurance Taxes and the Cyclical Properties of Employment and Unemployment，”Journal of Public Economics53 (January 1994)， 1-30.
M. Feldstein， “The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Temporary Layoff Unemployment，”American Economic Review65 (December 1978)， 834-846.
R. Topel， “On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance，”American Economic Review73 (1983)， 541-559.
Workers Compensation
R. Butler， D. Durbin， and N. Helvacian， “Increasing Claims For Soft Tissue In Workers' Compensation: Cost Shifting and Moral Hazard，”Journal of Risk and Uncertainty， 13 (1996)， 73-87.
* D. Card and B. McCall， “Is Workers' Compensation Covering Uninsured Medical Costs? Evidence from the Monday Effect，”Industrial and Labor Relations Review49(4)， pages 690-706， 1996.
P. Fishback and S. Kantor， “Did Workers Pay for the Passage of Workers's Compensation Laws?”Quarterly Journal of Economics110 (August 1995)， 713-742.
J. Gruber and A. Krueger， “The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from the Workers' Compensation Insurance，” in D. BradfordTax Policy and the Economy5 (Cambridge， MA: MIT Press， 1991)， 111-144.
A. Krueger， “Incentive Effects of Workers Compensation Insurance，”Journal of Public Economics41 (February 1990)， 73-100.
B. Meyer， K. Viscusi， and D. Durbin， “Workers' Compensation and Injury Duration: Evidence from a Natural Experiment，”American Economic Review85 (June 1995)， 322-340.
K. Viscusi and M. Moore， “Workers' Compensation: Wage Effects， Benefit Inadequacies， and the Value of Health Losses，”Review of Economics and Statistics， 66 (May 1987)， 249-261.
Disability Insurance
* D. Autor and M. G. Duggan， "The Rise In The Disability Rolls And The Decline In Unemployment，"The Quarterly Journal of Economics， Vol. 118 (1) pp. 157-205， 2003.
L. Borghans， A. Gielen， and E. Luttmer， “Social Support Substitution and the Earnings Rebound: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity in Disability Insurance Reform，” Dartmouth Univ. mimeo， 2013
* J. Bound， “The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance Applicants，”American Economic Review79 (1989)， 482-503.
J. Bound and R. Burkhauser， “Economic Analysis of Transfer Programs Targeted on People with Disabilities”，Handbook of Labor Economics(vol 3C)， Chap 51， 1999.
J. Bound and T. Waidmann， “Disability Transfers， Self-Reported Health， and the Labor Force Attachment of Older Men: Evidence from the Historical Record，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， (1992)， 1393-1419.
P. Diamond and J. Mirrlees， “A Model of Social Insurance with Variable Retirement，”Journal of Public Economics， (1978) 295-336
* P. Diamond and E. Sheshinski， “Economic Aspects of Optimal Disability Benefits，”Journal of Public Economics57 (1995)， 1-24.
M. Golosov and A. Tsyvinski， “Designing Optimal Disability Insurance，”Journal of Political Economy，2006.
* J. Gruber， “Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply，”Journal of Political Economy108 (2000)， 1162-1183.
N. Maestas， K. Mullen and A. Strand， “Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt，”American Economic Review， forthcoming.
D. Parsons， “The Decline of Male Labor Force Participation，”Journal of Political Economy88 (February 1980)， 117-134.
M. Stephens “The Long-Run Consumption Effects of Earnings Shocks”，Review of Economics and Statistics， Vol.83 (2001)， pp.28-36.
Public Goods and Externalities
Externalities and Pigouvian Policies
Theory
R. Arnott and J. Stiglitz， “Moral Hazard and Optimal Commodity Taxation”，Journal of Public Economics， 29(1)， February 1986， 1-24.
D. Fullerton and G. Metcalf， “Environmental Taxes and the Double-Dividend Hypothesis: Did You Really Expect Something for Nothing?”Chicago-Kent Law Review，73(1): 221-256， 1998. Also available as NBER Working Paper 6199， September 1997.
L. Goulder， “Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend”，International Tax and Public Finance， 2(2)， August 1995， 157-183.
J. Poterba， “Tax Policy to Combat Global Warming”， in R. Dornbush and J. Poterba， ed.，Global Warming: Economic Policy Responses， 71-98， Cambridge， MA: MIT Press， 1991.
B. Salanie，The Economics of Taxation， Cambridge: MIT Press， 2003， Chapter 10.
A. Sandmo， “Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities”，Swedish Journal of Economics， 77(1)， 1975， 86-98.
M. Weitzman， “Prices vs. Quantities”，Review of Economic Studies， 41(4)， October 1974， 477-491.
Applications
J. Currie， M. Greenstone， and E. Moretti， "Superfund Cleanups and Infant Health"American Economic Review， 101(3)， May 2011， 435–41.
* P. Diamond and J. Hausman， “Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?”，Journal of Economic Perspectives， 8， Fall 1994， 45-64.
* A. Edlin and P. Karaca-Mandic， “The Accident Externality from Driving，”Journal of Political Economy114(5)， 2006.
E. Rossi-Hansberg， P. Sarte， R. Owens， “Housing Externalities，”Journal of Political Economy，118(3): 485-535， 2010.
E. Glaeser and E. Luttmer， “The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control”，American Economic Review， 93(4)， 1027-1046， September 2003.
J. Gruber and B. Koszegi， 2001. “Is Addiction Rational? Theory and Evidence”，Quarterly Journal of Economics， 116(4)， 1261-1305.
M. Kremer and E. Miguel “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities.”Econometrica72(1): 159-217.
E. Rossi-Hansberg， P. Sarte， R. Owens， “Housing Externalities” NBER Working Paper No. 14369， 2008.
Public Goods
Theory
J. Andreoni， “Charitable Giving”New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics， 2ndEdition， 2007.
J. Andreoni， 1990. “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm Glow Giving，”Economic Journal100， 464-477.
A. Atkinson and N. Stern， “Pigou， Taxation and Public Goods，”Review of Economic Studies(1974)
Atkinson and Stiglitz，Lectures on Public EconomicsChaps. 16 and 17 and pages 457-76
Auerbach and Feldstein ， Handbook of Public Economics (vol 2)， Chap 9; (chap 10); chap 11， pp. 571- 601
* T. Bergstrom， L. Blume and H. Varian， “On the Private Provision of Public Goods，”Journal of Public Economics29， 1986， 25-49.
Evans， Mary F. and Vossler， Christian A. and Flores， Nicholas E.， "Hybrid allocation mechanisms for publicly provided goods，"Journal of Public Economics， vol. 93(1-2)， pages 311-325， February， 2009.
D. Foley， “Lindahl’s Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods.”，Econometrica， 38， 1970， 66-72.
* T. Gaube， “When do Distortionary Taxes Reduce the Optimal Supply of Public Goods?”，Journal of Public Economics76， 2000， 151-180.
L. Kaplow， “The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation.”，National Tax Journal49， 1996， 513-532.
M. Kosfeld and Akira Okada and Arno Riedl， "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games，"American Economic Review， vol. 99(4)， pages 1335-55， September， 2009.
C. Kreiner and N. Verdelin， 2010. “Optimal Provision of Public Goods: A Synthesis.” ForthcomingScandinavian Journal of Economics.
W. Oakland， “Theory of Public Goods”，Handbook of Public Economics(vol 2)， Chap 9.
* P. Samuelson， “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure，”Review of Economics and Statistics387-89， 1954
J. Wilson， “Optimal Public Good Provision with Limited Lump-sum Taxation”，American Economic Review81， 1991， pp. 153-66.
P. Warr， “The Private Provision of a Pure Public Good is Independent of the Distribution of Income.”，Economic Letters， 13， 1983， 207-211.
Evidence
J. Andreoni， “Why Free-Ride?”，Journal of Public Economics37， 1988， 291-304.
J. Andreoni， “An Experimental Test of the Public Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis”，American Economic Review83 (5)， 1317-27， 1993.
* J. Andreoni and A. Payne， “Do Government Grants to Private Charities Crowd Out Giving or Fundraising?”American Economic Review， 93(3)， June 2003， 792-812.
R. Chetty， E. Saez， and L. Sandor， "What Policies Motivate Pro-Social Behavior? An Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics" Harvard Working paper， September 2012.
S. Dellavigna， J. List， and U. Malmendier， "Testing for Altruism and Social Pressure in Charitable Giving"Quarterly Journal of Economics， forthcoming.
Fack， Gabrielle， and Camille Landais. 2010. "Are Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving Efficient? Evidence from France." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy， 2(2): 117–41.
M. Feldstein and C. Clotfelter， "Tax Incentives and Charitable Contributions in the United States，"Journal of Public Economics， 1976.
M. Feldstein and A. Taylor， "The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions，"Econometrica， 1976.
* A. Gerber， D. Green， and C. Larimer， "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large Scale Field Experiment”American Political Science Review，102， February 2008， 33-48.
* D. Hungerman “Are Church and State Substitutes? Evidence from the 1996 Welfare Reform，”Journal of Public Economics89 (2005)， 2245-2267.
B. Kingma， “An Accurate Measurement of the Crowd-Out Effect， Income Effect， and Price Effect for Charitable Contributions，”Journal of Political Economy97 (1989)， 1197-1207.
N. Lacetera and M. Macis， "Do All Material Incentives for Prosocial Activities Backfire? The Response to Cash and Non-Cash Incentives for Blood Donations"，Journal of Economic Psychology， 31(4)， 2010， 738–748.
* G. Marwell and R. Ames， “Economists Free-Ride， Does Anyone Else?”，Journal of Public Economics15， 1981， 295-310.
J. Potters， M. Sefton， and L. Vesterlund. “After You - Endogenous Sequencing in Voluntary Contribution Games.”Journal of Public Economics， August 2005， 1399-1419.
W. Randolph， “Dynamic Income， Progressive Taxes， and the Timing of Charitable Contributions，”Journal of Political Economy103 (1995)， 709-738.
Corporate Taxation
Payout and Corporate Profits Taxes
F. Allen and R. Michaely， “Payout Policy，” in Handbook of the Economics of Finance (Constantinides et. al eds)， 2003.
D. Bernheim， "Tax Policy and the Dividend Puzzle，" RAND Journal of Economics 22 (Winter 1991)， 455-476.
* D. Bernheim and A. Wantz， "A Tax-Based Test of the Dividend Signalling Hypothesis，" American Economic Review 85 (June 1995)， 532-551.
J. Boyd and R. Jagannathan， "Ex-Dividend Price Behavior of Common Stocks，" Review of Financial Studies 7 (Winter 1994)， 711-741.
A. Brav， J. Graham， C. Harvey and R. Michaely， “Payout Policy in the 21st Century，”Journal of Financial Economics77， 483-527.
A. Brav， J. Graham， C. Harvey， and R. Michaely， “The Effect of the May 2003 Dividend Tax Cut on Corporate Dividend Policy: Empirical and Survey Evdience，”National Tax Journal61 (2008)， 381-396.
R. Chetty and E. Saez， “Dividend Taxes and Corporate Behavior: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut，”Quarterly Journal of Economics， 120(3)， August 2005， 791-833.
R. Chetty， J. Rosenberg， and E. Saez， “The Effects of Taxes on Market Responses to Dividend Announcements and Payments: What Can we Learn from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut?，” in A. Auerbach， J. Hines and J. Slemrod， eds.，Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press， 2007). Also available as NBER Working Paper 11452.
R. Chetty and E. Saez， “Dividend and Corporate Taxation in an Agency Model of the Firm，” AEJ: Economic Policy， 2(3)， August 2010， 1-31.
* M. Devereux， L. Liu， and S. Loretz， "The Elasticity of Corporate Taxable Income: New Evidence from UK Tax Records，" Working Papers 1223 (2013)， Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
* S. Djankov， T. Ganser， C. McLiesh， R. Ramalho， and A. Shleifer， "The Effect of Corporate Taxes on Investment and Entrepreneurship." American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics (2010)， 2(3): 31-64.
R. Gordon and B. Malkiel， "Corporation Finance"， in H. Aaron and J. Pechman， eds.， How Do Taxes Affect Economic Behavior (Brookings: Washington， 1981)， 131-198.
J. Graham， "How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?，" Journal of Finance 55 (October 2000)， 1901-41.
A. Korinek and J. Stiglitz，”Dividend Taxation and Intertemporal Arbitrage，”Journal of Public Economics， 93 (2009)， 142-159.
J. Poterba， “Taxation and Corporate Payout Policy，”American Economic Review94 (2004)， 171-175.
D. Yagan， “Do Payout Taxes Reduce Investment? Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the United States，” UC-Berkeley mimeo， 2013
Tax Incentives for Investment
A. Auerbach， M. Devereux， and H. Simpson， “Taxing Corporate Income，” inDimensions of Tax Design: The Mirrlees Review(Oxford University Press， 2010)， 837-892.
R. Caballero， E. Engel， and J. Haltiwanger， "Plant Level Adjustment and Aggregate Investment
Dynamics，" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1995:2， 1-39.
Y. Chen， Z. He， and L. Zhang， “The Effect of Investment Tax Incentives: Evidence from China's Value Added Tax Reform，” Tsinghua University mimeo， 2011.
J. Cummins， K. Hassett， and R. G. Hubbard， “A Reconsideration of Investment Behavior Using Tax Reforms as Natural Experiments，” Brookings Papers 1994， 2:1-74.
R. Hall and D. Jorgenson. “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior.” American Economic Review 57(3): 391-414， 1967.
C. House and M. Shapiro， “Temporary Investment Tax Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation，”American Economic Review98 (2008)， 737-768.
M. Knittel， “Corporate Response to Accelerated Tax Depreciation: Bonus Depreciation for Tax Years 2002-2004，” U.S. Treasury Office of Tax Analysis Working Paper 98， May 2007
* O. Lamont， “Cash Flow and Investment: Evidence from Internal Capital Markets，” Journal of Finance 52 (March 1997)， 83-109.
L. Summers， “Taxation and Corporate Investment: A q-Theory Approach.”Brookings Papers on Economic Activity， 1981:1， 67-127.
L. Summers， "Investment， Taxation， and Q"， Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1:1981， 67-127.
Taxation and Capital Structure
A. Auerbach， "Taxation， Corporate Financial Policy， and the Cost of Capital，" Journal of Economic Literature 21 (1983)， 905-940， esp. section IV.
A. Auerbach， "The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Cost of Capital，" Journal of Economic
Perspectives 1 (1987)， 73-86.
A. Auerbach， "Taxation and Corporate Financial Policy，" in A. Auerbach and M. Feldstein， eds.， Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 3 (Amsterdam: Elsevier， 2002)， 1252-1292. Also available as NBER Working Paper No. 8203.
J. Edgerton， “Investment， Accounting， and the Salience of the Corporate Income Tax，” Federal Reserve Board Working Paper， 2012.
S. Fazzari， R. Hubbard， and B. Peterson， "Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment，" Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1987:2， 141-195.
A. Goolsbee， "Investment Incentives and the After-Tax Price of Capital Goods，" Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (1998)， 121-148.
*J. Graham， "Debt and the Marginal Tax Rate，" Journal of Financial Economics 41 (May 1996)， 41-74.
K. Hassett and R. G. Hubbard， "Tax Policy and Business Investment，" in A. Auerbach and M.
Feldstein， eds.， Handbook of Public Economics， Volume 3 (Amsterdam: Elsevier， 2002)， 1294-
1343. Also available asNBER Working Paper 5683.
J. Mackie-Mason， "Do Taxes Affect Corporate Financing Decisions，" Journal of Finance 45 (1990)， 1471-1494.
M. Miller， "Debt and Taxes"， Journal of Finance 32 (1977)， 261-275.
M. Modigliani and M. Miller， “The Cost of Capital， Corporation Finance， and the Theory of Investment，” American Economic Review 48 261-297.
J. Poterba and L. Summers， "The Economic Effects of Dividend Taxation，" in E. Altman and M. Subrahmanyam， eds.， Recent Advances in Corporation Finance (Homewood， IL: Dow Jones-Irwin， 1985)， 227-284.
Organizational Form and International Taxation
A. Auerbach. “A Modern Corporate Tax.” Center for American Progress， 2010.
M. Devereux， R. Griffith， and A. Klemm. “Corporate Income Tax Reforms and International Tax Competition.” Economic Policy 17: 449-495， 2002.
D. Dharmapala， C. Foley， and K. Forbes， "Watch What I Do， Not What I Say: The Unintended Consequences of the Homeland Investment Act，"Journal of Finance， American Finance Association (2011)， vol. 66(3)， pages 753-787， 06.
R. Gordon and J. Mackie-Mason， 1994. “Tax distortions to the choice of organizational form，” Journal of Public Economics， Elsevier， vol. 55(2)， pages 279-306， October.
J. Hines， Jr. and E. Rice， “Fiscal Paradise: Foreign Tax Havens and American Business”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics， Vol. 109porn hongkongdoll， No. 1 (Feb.， 1994)， pp. 149-182.
上一篇：夫妻性生活姿势道具 她4岁遭强奸，13岁嫁老翁，临了却援助了上亿东谈主!
下一篇：没有了
